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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR L. MURRAY, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
OGDEN CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation, and THE 
STANDARD CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 14249 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STANDARD CORPORATION 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained 
by Appellant when a manhole cover moved when he stepped on 
it, allowing him to fall into an abandoned water meter manhole 
while walking along an Ogden City sidewalk. Appellant sued 
both Ogden City and the abutting property owner, Standard 
Corporation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Both Respondents, Ogden City and Standard Corporation, 
made Motions for Summary Judgment, which were granted by the 
Lower Court. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Standard Corporation requests this Court 
to affirm the Summary Judgment rendered by the Lower Court 
in its favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December 7, 1973, Appellant was 
walking west on 23rd Street in Ogden, Utah, along the public 
sidewalk, when he stepped upon a manhole cover which moved 
in such a manner as to allow him to fall into the manhole. 
(Dep. 10, 16) The said manhole was vacant inasmuch as the 
water meter and water service had been moved by Ogden City 
several years prior to the accident. (R 28-29; Dep. 18, 52) 
The manhole cover was observed by the Appellant 
prior to his stepping upon it, and it appeared normal and 
flush with the surface of the sidewalk. (Dep. 15-18) , 
Appellant has no knowledge of any defect in the j 
manhole cover or ring. (Dep. 39, 51) I 
The manhole cover and ring were inspected immediately i 
after the accident by employees of Ogden City, and no defects < 
of any kind were observed. (R 50) 
When the manhole cover was placed back into the 
ring over the hole immediately after the accident, it fit 
properly and snugly. (R 50, 51 and 52) 
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Ogden City employees, after replacing the manhole 
cover into the ring over the hole, physically attempted to 
loosen the cover by jumping upon it, but were unable to dis-
lodge it. (R 52) 
Ogden City had no knowledge of any dangerous con-
ditions regarding said cover or ring prior to the accident 
in question. (R 50, 52, 53, and 54) 
Respondent Standard Corporation owns and occupies 
the premises which abut the sidewalk where the accident occurred. 
(R 5) 
Respondent Standard Corporation had no notice or 
knowledge of any dangerous condition of the said manhole 
cover prior to or at the time of the accident in question. 
(R 44-45) 
The Standard Corporation at one time had received 
its water through a meter situated in the said manhole; however, 
in 1968, Ogden City moved the said water meter from 23rd Street 
to another street. Since that time, the subject manhole did 
not contain a water meter, nor did it supply water to Stan-
dard Corporation. (R 28-29) 
Summary judgment was granted to both Respondents 
upon the grounds that as a matter of law, the uncontroverted 
evidence clearly showed that the manhole cover and ring were 
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not defective, and, furthermore, that neither Respondent 
had notice of the loose or otherwise dangerous condition of 
the said manhole cover prior to or at the time of the accident, 
and that there is no evidence as to how the manhole cover 
became loose or for how long the said manhole cover was loose 
before the accident* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT STANDARD CORPORATION, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, WAS NOT NEGLIGENT, AND THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF 
FACT REMAINING TO BE TRIED. 
The Summary Judgment which was granted Standard 
Corporation by the Trial Court was granted upon the ground 
that regardless of whether or not Standard Corporation, as 
abutting owner, had any legal responsibility for the manhole 
in question, the evidence clearly indicates that the said 
manhole cover was not defective, and that Standard Corporation 
had no notice of the manhole cover being loose or otherwise 
dangerous. 
The evidence is clear that the manhole cover and 
ring were not defective at the time of the accident. The 
affidavits of the employees of Ogden City testify that the 
manhole cover and ring were free of defect upon immediate 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
inspection after the accident, and that, in fact, the cover 
was replaced in the ring over the hole and tests applied as 
to jumping and attempting to move the ring out of the hole, 
all unsuccessfully. Furthermore, the Appellant, himself, 
testified in his deposition that he knew of no defects in 
the cover and the ring. 
Therefore, the only remaining possibility to 
explain the accident would be for the cover to have been 
partially out of its normal place within the manhole cover 
ring. This could have happened at any time, and could have 
been caused by any person. It may have been moved out of 
place by a youngster, or teenager, or mischievous vandal 
within seconds or minutes prior to the Appellant's approach 
and accident. It is simply unknown who loosened the cover 
from its ring or how long it was in that condition prior to 
the accident. 
As the uncontroverted affidavit of William 
Glasmann of Standard Corporation testifies, the said Respon-
dent had no notice or information of any kind regarding a 
defective or dangerous condition in regard to this manhole 
cover prior to the accident. 
There are no remaining facts at issue. Based upon 
these facts, Standard Corporation was entitled to a Summary 
Judgment. 
-5-
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In Tripp v. Granite Holding Co., 22 Utah 2d 175, 
450 P.2d 99 (1969) a plaintiff was injured in a fall due to 
a defective public sidewalk. The plaintiff sued the abutting 
owner and the trial court granted a summary judgment in 
favor of the abutting owner and stated, quoting from an 
earlier Utah case: 
There exists no obligation on the part of an 
abutter to keep the sidewalk adjoining his 
premises un repair, nor is he liable for any 
state of disrepair. His obligation can only 
arise where he creates through use or other-
wise some unsafe or dangerous condition. 
In our case, there was no defect, but only a 
dangerous condition of a temporary nature. In such cases, 
the Utah Supreme Court has held that in order to hold an 
owner or other responsible party liable for a temporary 
condition, such person must have knowledge of the dangerous 
condition, or the dangerous condition must exist for such 
length of time that such person, by reasonable inspection, 
should have discovered it. 
In Howard v. Auerbach Co., 20 Utah 2d 355, 437 
P.2d 895, a customer slipped on some oil on the escalator in 
the store and fell, injuring herself. Summary judgment in 
favor of Auerbachs was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court, 
which stated: 
• . . the record is devoid of any indication 
who put any oil on the steps of the escalator 
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or, if so, it was for such a time that the 
store people reasonably could have discovered 
and removed it. 
The court further stated that the Auerbach case 
fell directly within the law enunciated in Koer v. Mayfair 
Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, where a customer slipped 
and fell on a grape on the floor of the store. The customer 
alleged that the store manager had passed by the spot where 
the accident occurred just prior to the accident and, therefore, 
either had actual knowledge or constructive notice of the 
presence of the substance on the floor and should have removed 
it# The trial court granted a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, which was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court stated: 
We concede that the grape on the floor was a 
dangerous condition and that the plaintiff 
slipped and fell by reason of such condition. 
But we are not able from the evidence to find 
any support for the further and necessary infer-
ence that this condition was caused by an act 
of the defendant, or that the defendant had 
actual or constructive knowledge of it. We 
just cannot ignore the fact that the grape 
was only seen after the fall occurred. From 
these circumstances alone a jury could not 
be justified in inferring that the grape had 
been there for such a period of time that, had 
the defendant exercised reasonable care, he 
should have known of its presence. Furthermore, 
there was testimony at trial that others were 
shopping in the aisle. It is quite possible 
that one of them dropped the grape on the floor 
after the manager passed by. There may have 
been any number of reasons, including legitimate 
pre-occupation with other problems than whether 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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there was a grape on the floor, or that other 
shoppers may have blocked his view, as to 
why the manager did not see it. It seems 
unfair to permit even a jury with its admittedly 
broad prerogatives, to conclude on the one 
hand that it was the manager's duty and that 
he must have seen it, but on the other, that 
it was not the plaintiff's duty and she was 
excused from doing so. 
The Court in the Koer case recognized and followed 
the rule set down in Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company, 3 Utah 2d 
364, 284 P.2d 477. In that case, a coffee shop patron 
slipped on water and fell. The Supreme Court held that the 
coffee shop owner would not be liable to a patron in absence 
of showing how or when water got on to the floor or that the 
owner had knowledge of its presence. The Court stated: 
. . . although the evidence indicated that a 
waitress delivered water in glasses to plaintiff 
and her companion, there is no evidence as to 
whether the waitress, the plaintiff, her com-
panion, other patrons or persons spilled the 
water on the floor, or exactly when it was 
spilled, or whether the management knew of 
its existence. In other words, there was no 
evidence as to how the water got on the floor, 
by whom it was deposited, exactly when it 
arrived there or that the defendant had knowledge 
of its presence. Under such circumstances, a 
jury cannot be permitted to speculate that the 
defendant was negligent. 
In Long v. Smith Food King Store, Utah 2d 
, 531 P.2d 350, an action brought by a store customer 
against the store for injuries he received when he slipped 
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and fell upon substance upon the floor, the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the summary judgment in behalf of the store, 
based upon the above cases. Referring to the above cases, 
the Court stated: 
The soundness of the basic rules reflected in 
those cases is not questioned here: that in 
order to impose liability for an injury resulting 
from some foreign substance or defective con-
dition, it must have existed for some time and 
manner that in due care the defendant either knew 
or should have known, and remedied it; and the 
variance thereof, that if the condition or 
defect was created by the defendant himself 
or his agents or employees, the notice require-
ment does not apply. 
The latest statement of the Court came in Allen v. 
Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., _ _ _ Utah 2d _, 538 P. 2d 
175, where a customer slipped and fell in a store on cottage 
cheese. In reply to the appellant's plea for more liberal 
law in this area, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
. . . the correct policy is to accord fair 
and even handed justice to both by assuring 
to each the remedies and protections that the 
established rules of law give him; and when 
loss or injury occurs, let it rest where it 
falls, unless it is affirmatively shown that 
another was at fault; and that that was the 
cause of the injury. 
In the case at bar, the Appellant saw the manhole 
cover before stepping upon it, and it appeared normal to him. 
However, when he stepped upon it, it tipped or slipped away, 
causing him to fall. Of all persons who were in the best 
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position at that time to know of the condition of the manhole 
cover, it was the Appellant himself. 
The Appellant saw no defects in the cover or the 
ring. There is no evidence of how or why the cover was out 
of its normal position. There is no evidence of how long 
the cover was out of its normal position. The cover may 
well have been tipped out of its position by any stranger, 
moments before the accident. 
The evidence is clear that by the inspection of 
Ogden City employees the cover and ring were not defective 
or damaged in any way. The cover was placed back into its 
position and found to be normal and safe. The cover could 
not be jarred out of that position by the jumping tests 
and other tests applied by Ogden City employees. And, Ogden 
City employees had no knowledge, prior to the accident, of 
a dangerous condition involving this manhole cover. 
Respondent Standard Corporation, the abutting land-
owner, had no knowledge of any dangerous condition or problem 
with this manhole cover prior to the accident in question. 
It is respectfully submitted that there is no 
evidence of negligence on the part of Respondent Standard 
Corporation, and that the Trial Court's decision granting a 
Summary Judgment to Standard Corporation should be affirmed. 
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POINT II. 
THE GRANTING OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
PROPER IN THIS CASE. 
Standard Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was timely. It was filed, with supporting affidavits, on 
July 14, 1975. It was properly noticed up and heard by the 
Trial Court on August 5, 1975, less than five weeks away 
from trial. 
The affidavits of William Glasmann of Standard 
Corporation, as well as the affidavits of the employees of 
Ogden City, clearly showed that the cover and ring were not 
defective at the time of the accident, and that the Standard 
Corporation had no notice, whatsoever, prior to or at the time 
of the accident, of the manhole cover being out of its normal 
position, or any other dangerous condition. 
The Appellant failed to adequately counter the 
affidavits filed by both Respondents. 
At the hearing on both Respondents1 Motions for 
Summary Judgment, the Trial Court heard extensive arguments 
of all counsel, which, unfortunately, were not recorded. 
The Trial Court also had before it supporting affidavits filed 
by Standard Corporation and Ogden City, as well as objections 
and affidavits which were submitted to the Court at the time 
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of the hearing but not filed until afterward. Based upon 
the oral arguments of all counsel, and considering all 
affidavits and objections filed by all parties, the Court 
granted both Respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Appellant contends that he has been deprived of 
an opportunity to show issues of fact because he has not had 
an opportunity to complete his discovery in this case. How-
ever, the completion of discovery is not the criteria as to 
whether or not a Summary Judgment should be granted. To 
allow otherwise, any party to any lawsuit could always raise 
the question of discovery in avoidance of Motions for Summary 
Judgment. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides specifically that a defendant party "may, at any 
time, move with or without supporting affidavits for summary 
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof." (Rule 
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.) 
In the case at bar, the Motions for Summary Judgment 
were heard on August 5, 1975, more than fifteen months after 
the complaint was filed, and merely five weeks away from 
trial. Appellant had more than ample time in which to 
institute discovery proceedings. Nothing was done in this 
regard until after the hearing. 
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It should be pointed out, in fairness, that 
Appellant did file and serve upon Standard Corporation inter-
rogatories on December 27, 1974. These interrogatories were 
inadvertently misplaced and overlooked. However, these inter-
rogatories are completely immaterial in this matter, inasmuch 
as each and every question asked in those particular interrog-
atories has been fully answered or admitted to in Standard 
Corporation's answer to the complaint or the affidavit of 
William Glasmann. Specifically, we point out these answers 
as follows: 
1. Interrogatories number 1, 2, and 3 inquired as 
to who was the owner or lessor of the property abutting the 
sidewalk in question. Standard Corporation in its answer to 
the complaint admitted that it was the owner of the property 
in question. (R 5-6) 
2* Interrogatory number 4 inquired as to the 
legal duty for maintaining the said meter box and cover. 
This interrogatory is improper in that it calls for a legal 
conclusion. In any case, it was answered in Standard Cor-
proation's answer to the complaint wherein Standard Corporation 
denied responsibility for the sidewalk and affirmatively 
alleged that it was a public sidewalk and was owned and 
maintained by Ogden City. (R 5-6) 
3. Interrogatories number 5 and 6 inquired as to 
-i v 
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knowledge by Standard Corporation of negligent maintenance 
and conduct to maintain the meter box and cover in question. 
These interrogatories were answered by Standard Corporation 
in its answer to the complaint and in the affidavit of 
William Glasmann, and in Standard Corporation's answer to 
the crossclaim filed by Ogden City against it. (R 5-6, 
44-45) 
But even more important is the fact that after the 
said interrogatories were served by the Appellant upon Standard 
Corporation on December 27, 1974, the Appellant filed with 
the Court a Notice of Readiness for Trial, properly signed, 
which certified "that such use of the rules of discovery 
as counsel feels necessary for the trial of this cause has 
been completed, and that the case is at issue." (R 32) 
It should be further noted that the Appellant, at 
no time, inquired of Standard Corporation for answers to these 
interrogatories, nor did the Appellant utilize Rule 37 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the 
proper procedure in compelling discovery when necessary. The 
said rule provides that where interrogatories have not been 
answered, that the discovering party Mmay move for an order 
compelling an answer . . ." 
Furthermore, at the pretrial conference on May 20, 
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1975, Appellant made no mention of the said interrogatories, 
nor did he at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment 
itself. 
Inasmuch as the questions asked within the said 
interrogatories have already been admitted to or answered in 
the answer of Standard Corporation or the affidavit of its 
Vice President, and the Appellant, after having served the 
said interrogatories, certified to the Court that discovery 
had been completed and the case was at issue, and since the 
Appellant did not compel answers to interrogatories or even 
informally request answers to the same at the pretrial con-
ference, the hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment, or 
at any other time, Appellant should not now be allowed to 
raise this question in hopes of setting aside the Summary 
Judgment on a mere legal technicality. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent Standard Corporation respectfully 
submits that the Summary Judgment granted in its favor by 
the Trial Court should be affirmed. The evidence is clear 
that the said manhole cover and ring were not defective 
in any way, and that Standard Corporation had no notice of 
any kind that the manhole cover was out of its proper 
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position prior to or at the time the Appellant stepped upon 
it. Regardless of whether or not Standard Corporation, the 
abutting owner, had a responsibility for this abandoned 
manhole cover and ring, the fact remains that Stnadard Cor-
poration had no prior notice of any problem with this manhole 
cover. To submit this case to a jury would compel a jury 
to base its decision upon pure speculation. Standard Cor-
poration respectfully submits that its Summary Judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submi 
rSfjjm&Apt 
vufiONARD H. RUSSON 
HANSON, WADSWORTH 
70£ Kearns Buildin 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent 
Standard Corporation 
§ RU\S0N 
o 
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